

**SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF BERNALILLO
STATE OF NEW MEXICO**

Case No. CV-2006-04892

**ONE 2005 HYUNDAI , 4-DOOR AUTOMOBILE,
NEW MEXICO VEHICLE LICENSE NO. HDL649,
and JOSIE NICASIO, its Owner,**

Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE,

Respondent.

PETITIONERS' STATEMENT OF REVIEW ISSUES

Petitioners in this unusual case are a car and its owner. Petitioners contend that the City's application of a public nuisance abatement ordinance to support the City's imposition of fines and penalties for an alleged traffic infraction is unlawful, unconstitutional, unsupported by evidence, and outside the jurisdiction of the City's administrative process.

1. Issues

The issue in this case is the legality, constitutionality, and propriety of the City of Albuquerque's red light camera surveillance and traffic enforcement program. The City of Albuquerque enacted a "Safe Traffic Operations Program" (hereinafter, "STOP") Ordinance, No. O-05-96, authorizing surveillance cameras to photograph vehicles throughout the City of Albuquerque. The Ordinance establishes fines and penalties for alleged traffic light, turn signal, and speed violations based on the "evidence" gathered by the cameras provided by a private company..

The City of Albuquerque is a home-rule municipality, located in Bernalillo County, New Mexico. The Albuquerque STOP Ordinance purports to allow the City and its Police Department to charge, enforce, and penalize an alleged traffic violation by declaring the vehicle a “public nuisance.” The purported “nuisance” is then “abated” by intimidating and punishing its owner. The City has thereby created a strict liability offense, theoretically civil rather than criminal in nature, in which the vehicle is the offender, vehicle ownership is the offense, and a camera is the enforcer.

Petitioners ask the Court to conclude that the Albuquerque STOP Ordinance is unreasonable and irrational in declaring the 2005 Hyundai and its registered owner “public nuisances.” Significantly, the City fails to present any proof whatsoever that this particular vehicle was a nuisance, caused any harm, or even had any tendency or proclivity to harm or annoy.

Petitioner also asks the Court to determine that the charged offense in this case, entering an intersection on a red arrow, is a criminal misdemeanor properly within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Court. The charging and citation process are impermissible and the charges against Petitioners are neither within the civil administrative jurisdiction of the City or its Hearing Officer, nor within the proper jurisdiction of the City as part of its nuisance abatement process.

Furthermore, Petitioners will show that the City’s application of its STOP Ordinance violates the City’s own ordinances, deprives Petitioners and others of important due process rights, and constitutes an abuse of the administrative powers of the City under its Home Rule statute. For all those reasons, Petitioners ask the Court to review and rescind the City’s STOP Ordinance and refund the “fine” paid by Ms. Nicasio.

2. Summary of Proceedings

The Albuquerque City Council passed the STOP Ordinance on March 7, 2005; the Ordinance became effective on April 6, 2005. The Albuquerque STOP Ordinance was thereafter amended to eliminate a mandatory, non-refundable \$50.00 “hearing fee,” and to permit the “nomination” of someone other than the registered owner as the alleged violator in addition to the photographed motor vehicle. A second amendment increased the fine for speeding and allowed movement of speed enforcement vans from school zones to anywhere within the City limits. Additional amendments added a variety of “offenses” to the City’s “nuisance abatement” scheme, purportedly “decriminalizing” those offenses for the purpose of bringing them under a less rigorous civil administrative process that eliminates or compromises due process rights.

In this case, Ms. Nicasio received a notice in the mail charging that her car had violated the City’s STOP Ordinance and stating that she, as the registered owner of the vehicle, must pay a \$100.00 penalty. According to the Notice of Violation:

Failure to pay this fine on time will lead to serious legal consequences including the loss of your vehicle and the assessment of additional fines and monies due. A second or subsequent STOP violation within two years from the date of this STOP Fine will lead to increasing fines and penalties including loss of the subject vehicle. After you have received this STOP Fine, it is a criminal violation to sell, transfer or otherwise convey title to the subject motor vehicle to another person unless all applicable STOP Fines are paid.

The Notice also stated that “To CONTEST this STOP Fine you MUST request a Hearing.”

According to the Notice:

It is your burden to prove any of the following available defenses: 1) the vehicle was stolen or otherwise being driven without your knowledge or permission at the time of the violation. You must have a police report or other reliable evidence to avail yourself of this defense. 2) The ownership of the vehicle had lawfully been transferred and conveyed from you to another person before the time of the violation. To assert this defense, you must identify the transferee and provide proof of conveyance. 3) the evidence does not show that a violation was committed involving the subject vehicle.

The Hearing Officer will report his or her ruling on the Hearing no more than 10 days following the hearing. If you did not prevail at the Hearing, you must pay the STOP Fine and any attendant fines or penalties levied within 20 days.

On April 21, 2006, a letter on City stationery notified Ms. Nicasio of a hearing scheduled for May 9, 2006. The letter stated that:

you or a representative of your choosing should be prepared at that time to present your case. The City of Albuquerque, by and through the Albuquerque Police Department, will also be present. I shall preside over this hearing at the time, date, and place above stated.

The letter was signed “Albert V. Chavez/LR.”

Ms. Nicasio attended the hearing scheduled for May 9, 2006, along with “the representative of (her) choosing,” former City Police Officer Mark G. Bralley. Hearing Officer Chavez stated that Petitioners’ representative had to be an attorney, and the hearing was continued until May 23, 2006. At that time Ms. Nicasio (and her Hyundai) were represented by attorney Paul Livingston with Mr. Bralley serving as an expert witness. A recording of the hearing and a log were filed as part of the record in the case by the City.¹

The City was not represented by an attorney on the initial hearing date; its case was to be presented by a police officer. On May 23, however, the City had an Assistant City Attorney, Dannica Padilla, to present its case; Police Officer Joyce Roach acted as the City’s “witness.” At the end of the hearing Mr. Chavez stated that the City had presented sufficient evidence to support the charge of violation of the STOP Ordinance and levied the \$100.00 fine. Petitioner paid the fine and filed this Petition for Certiorari, seeking review by the District Court.

¹ Because the hearing record bears no timing indicators, references to the hearing are based on the real-time stated in the logs (starting at 2:30 p.m.) and/or the expired time during the hearing (starting at 0:00). There are two CDs; unless otherwise indicated, the references are to CD No. 1.

3. Argument and Authorities

The hearing in this case was held on May 23, 2006. The City's only "witness" was retired Police Officer Joyce Roach; she worked in the City's auto theft unit and was trained in red light camera enforcement by Lt. Haarhues, "who started this program." (1:59 pm). Officer Roach did not actually witness the violation; her testimony concerned the program and primarily consisted of her description of what she saw (or thought she saw) on the red light camera video.

The Petitioners' witness, former-Officer Mark Bralley was a law enforcement officer for more than 27 years, 24 of which were with the City of Albuquerque before he retired. He worked for about ten years in field services, and his specialty was video production work. Officer Bralley worked in the City's Video Productions Unit for four years. He is a former president of the Albuquerque Police Officers' Union; he holds a masters degree in Public Administration. (2:27 pm).

a. Neither Ms. Nicasio nor her Hyundai are a "Public Nuisance"

The first and primary reason the City's STOP Ordinance is improper and unlawful is that neither Ms. Nicasio nor her Hyundai are even arguably "public nuisances." The City of Albuquerque has authority pursuant to Section 3-18-17, NMSA, to define nuisances. The City Council found that:

Red light violations are a nuisance (STOP Ordinance, Section 1(A)). . . . drivers who fail or refuse to pay the fines and repeatedly run red lights create a severe nuisance that will not be abated unless the City . . . removes the instrumentality used to create this nuisance (Section 1(C)). . . . that a vehicle used to violate this Ordinance is the instrumentality of a nuisance that must be abated in the City, (Section (E)), . . . (and) declares that this Ordinance is a nuisance abatement ordinance enacted pursuant to the City's inherent authority under state law and that the remedies are purely civil and not criminal in nature. (Section 1(F)).

However, by defining and declaring certain vehicles to be “nuisances” because their owners have allegedly violated a nuisance abatement ordinance, the City has far exceeded its authority to enforce traffic laws.

At the hearing, the Police Officer confirmed that “the violation goes to the vehicle.” (2:17 p.m.). The City’s witness testified that neither she nor anyone else knew who was driving the Hyundai. (2:15 p.m.). “The vehicle becomes a nuisance on a first violation,” according to Officer Roach. “If they were to do it again, then it would still be under this nuisance violation again, however how much the violation is goes up.” Officer Roach testified that “it doesn’t matter who’s driving that vehicle” (2:16 p.m.), “the registered owner is solely responsible.” (38:09).

When the question was asked whether there is some characteristic of some vehicles that make them more prone to run red lights than others, the police officer responded, “probably so.” (2:17 p.m.). Officer Roach concluded that there is “legal justification for citing a car for being a nuisance because of what its driver does, regardless of the condition of the car, the age of the car, or anything else,” solely because “the City Council has passed that Ordinance, so since that Ordinance passed, yes I believe that.” (46:10).

The testimony of Officer Bralley, who had driven Ms. Nicasio’s car on several occasions, was clear: “It seems to be a new car, in fine running condition. Under my control it had no tendency to run red lights.” (49:30; 2:29 pm). He cites “a multitude of reasons” it is inappropriate to hold Ms. Nicasio’s car responsible for running a red light. (50:00)

The STOP Ordinance purports to be a nuisance abatement law, rather than a traffic enforcement law. However, as a matter of State and local law:

A public nuisance consists of knowingly creating, performing, or maintaining anything affecting any number of citizens without lawful authority which is either (A) injurious to public health, safety, morals or welfare; or (B) interferes with the exercise and enjoyment of public rights.

Whoever commits a public nuisance for which the act or penalty is not otherwise prescribed by law is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.

Section 30-801, NMSA

New Mexico law recognizes four types of nuisance: “public” and “private,” and “per se” and “in fact.” *City of Albuquerque v. State ex rel. Village of Los Ranchos*, 111 N.M. 608, 611; 808 P.2d 58, 61 (Ct. App. 1991). A nuisance per se is one which is at all times a nuisance; a nuisance in fact “is a condition which is not a nuisance per se but may become a nuisance in fact by reason of its circumstances, location, or surroundings. *Id.*, quoting *Denney v. United States*, 185 F.2d 108, 110 (10th Cir. 1950).

New Mexico courts have further defined a “public nuisance” as something that adversely affects “those who come in contact with it in the exercise of a public right or it otherwise affects the interests of the community at large.” *State ex rel. Village of Los Ranchos v. City of Albuquerque*, 119 N.M. 150; 889 P.2d 185 (1994). Violation of a city ordinance is not sufficient to prove either nuisance in fact or nuisance per se. *City of Sunland Park v. Harris News, Inc.*, 2005-NMCA-128, 124 P.3d 566.

Under the City’s STOP Ordinance, to the contrary, “hearsay is allowed . . . the owner of the vehicle, is responsible, according to the City’s Ordinance for, whoever the driver was on that day, running the red light.” (CD-2, 2:30-2:50). Relying on the City’s definition of the video as valid evidence, the City claims that “the officer has every right to rely on this evidence and present it to Mr. Chavez today.” (CD-2, 3:40).

Notably absent is any evidence at all that the vehicle in this case, a 2005 Hyundai four-door sedan, is a “public nuisance.” There is no basis at all for the City’s determination that either Ms. Nicasio or her car are “public nuisances,” that assessment of a \$100.00 fine against her or her vehicle would have any “abatement” effect, that there will be any reduction of accidents, or that the City is doing anything other than making money at the expense of drivers.

b. The City Lacks Jurisdiction Over Traffic Violations

The second major objection to the City’s STOP Ordinance and its application in this case is that the City treats what is a misdemeanor criminal offense as a civil matter and lacks jurisdiction to hear and decide such matters. A “Violation” under the STOP Ordinance is any:

conduct that would otherwise be defined as a traffic violation under 80-1-2-6 or 8-2-2-2 of this Code of Ordinances, Sections 66-7-105 or 66-7-301(A)(1) of the New Mexico State Motor Vehicle Code or other city or state laws pertaining to running red lights . . .

STOP Ordinance, Section 4. There is no doubt that what the STOP Ordinance addresses is what is properly considered a traffic violation under City traffic ordinances and the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code. The City’s transformation of traffic law enforcement into a nuisance abatement process does not alter the requirement that such an ordinance (or statute) must be enforced in a court of law rather than at a City administrative hearing. (1:48 pm).

Only the Metropolitan Court has jurisdiction over “offenses and complaints pursuant to ordinances of the county and of a municipality located within the county.” Section 34-8A-3, NMSA. Also, “with respect to civil actions, the right to trial by jury exists in all actions in the metropolitan court which are within metropolitan court jurisdiction.” Section 34-8A-5, NMSA. State law also provides that “all actions to enforce any ordinance of any municipality shall be brought in the name of the municipality, as plaintiff,” in the magistrate or municipal courts.

Section 35-15-1, NMSA. The law also provides the right to “appeal to the district court from the judgment of any municipal court.” Sec. 35-15-1(B), NMSA.

Despite the absence of judicial process at the City’s administrative hearings, at one point in the cross-examination, Officer Roach twice referred to the administrative hearing as “Court” (40:20) and at other hearings the police officers frequently refer to Mr. Chavez or Mr. Bingham, the City’s red-light camera hearing officers, as “Your Honor.”

On the other hand, Officer Bralley testified in support of the requirement of judicial process that:

The Ordinance itself is based upon requiring a violation of either the City traffic ordinance or the State traffic ordinance, and the only way to prove a violation of that ordinance is to run that violation through the appropriate jurisdictional and judicial authority, which in this jurisdiction is Metropolitan Court. The City of Albuquerque had a Municipal Court and in the 1978, 1979 time frame, the State of New Mexico took that jurisdiction away from the City of Albuquerque. The City of Albuquerque is not allowed to adjudicate anything either through their own court system or through a hearing system that goes outside of the administration of the City of Albuquerque. So the structure of this hearing is contrary to State law on who has jurisdiction. The State law specifically states that all hearings for violations of an ordinance must be heard in the Magistrate or Metropolitan Court, but beyond that, all nuisance abatements, the only exception, the sole adjudicator of that is the district court; and so the ordinance says you have to have a violation, that violation has to be proven in Metropolitan Court to the test of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ . . .

(51:00 - 51:40).

Specifically, with respect to “nuisance abatement,” under State law, Section 30-8-8, NMSA, (“abatement of a public nuisance”):

A civil action to abate a public nuisance may be brought, by verified complaint . . . by any public officer or private citizen, in the district court of the county where the public nuisance exists, against any person . . . who shall create, perform or maintain a public nuisance.

The statute also provides that such actions “shall be governed by the general rules of civil procedure.”

c. The STOP Ordinance Violates Constitutional Rights

The New Mexico Constitution provides for the right to a trial, Article II, Section 14; due process of law, Article II, Section 18,; and municipal home rule. Article X, Section 6. Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution provides, in part, the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” the right to have “compulsory process to compel the attendance of necessary witnesses,” and the right to “a speedy public trial.” By charging and punishing people accused of traffic offense misdemeanors as defined by Sections 66-7-105 or 66-7-301(A)(1) of the New Mexico State Motor Vehicle Code through a City Administrative Hearing Officer under the STOP Ordinance, the City of Albuquerque violates Article II, Sec. 14 of the New Mexico Constitution.

Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that “(n)o person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.” The Hearing Officer is a City employee, an agent of the Mayor. (2:25 pm). Therefore, the separation of powers inherent in the prosecution of traffic cases in the court system is necessarily lacking.

The fine for a first violation of the STOP Ordinance is set at \$100.00; a second violation within two years costs \$250.00; the fine for a third violation is \$500.00. The Ordinance provides that each violation is a “separate violation even if the two violations are not the same type of violation.” If fine is not paid within the prescribed 20 days the fine is tripled. A Police Officer may seize and the Department may immobilize a vehicle with unpaid STOP fines.” These penalties, particularly the seizure of vehicles, go far beyond the permissible penalties for misdemeanor violations and violate constitutional rights to due process. If, within ten years of the offense(s), the “owner fails or refuses to pay the charges . . . the Department may declare the

vehicle a nuisance and proceed to forfeit the vehicle.” This too constitutes a violation of legal and constitutional rights, as does the “relaxation” of the burden and standard of proof.

Officer Bralley found especially offensive:

some very serious due process issues here, that I mentioned earlier, about the proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof based on reasonable evidence and the ability of the Hearing Officer to make that determination. And that the rules of evidence in the Ordinance are relaxed extremely, that allows for such things as the running commentary, which in any other, even civil process, would be impermissible. And it has loosened the process so much that it’s no longer a fair process under the American concept of jurisprudence.

(55:00 - 55:53).

The New Mexico Constitution affords broader and more complete protections than the Constitution of the United States; separate, adequate, and independent state grounds exist for enjoining the STOP Ordinance pursuant to the aforementioned provisions of the New Mexico Constitution.

d. The STOP Ordinance is Contrary to City and State Laws

The New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code provides that “to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in Article 7 of Chapter 66, NMSA 1978, is a misdemeanor . . . unless the violation is declared a felony.” The State law also provides that “no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance, rule or regulation in conflict with” the Motor Vehicle Code “unless expressly authorized” therein. Section 66-7-8, NMSA. This provision was enacted by the legislature to ensure that traffic code provisions will be “uniform throughout (the) state.”

The New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code provides that “No person shall be arrested for violating the Motor Vehicle Code or other law relating to motor vehicles punishable as a

misdemeanor except by a commissioned, salaried peace officer who, at the time of arrest, is wearing a uniform clearly indicating his official status.” Sec. 66-8-124, NMSA.

Section 1-1-98 of the City’s Code of Ordinances provides for the issuance of citations and states the procedure for “issuance of ordinance violation and citation” includes the preparation of a “written notice to appear in Court” (underlining added), when the Mayor or his agent have “probable cause to believe that a person has violated any ordinance of the city punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.” The City’s Code of Ordinances, Sec. 8-1-1-1 provides that “it is a petty misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform an act required in this Traffic Code.

The Code of Ordinances, Sec. 8-1-3-7, states that “all citations issued under this Traffic Code shall be issued by a uniformed on-duty police officer” and that “no form of complaint other than a citation shall be used.” The City’s Code of Ordinances, Sec. 8-1-3-17 states that “an appeal de novo from the Municipal Court may be taken by filing with the District Court a notice of appeal and by posting an appeal bond within 15 days after judgment and sentence are rendered by the Municipal court. And Sec. 30-8-8, N.M.S.A., provides that abatement of a public nuisance will take place in the district court.

As discussed above, both State statutes and the City Code require that police officers bring and enforce violations of state motor vehicle statutes and the municipal traffic code before the Metropolitan Court rather by City administrative action. Officer Bralley described the difference between a traffic stop and arrest by a police officer (53:00) and the use of red light camera technology under the City of Albuquerque’s present STOP Ordinance, which represents efforts by the City of Albuquerque:

over the years ... to find ways around the technical problems, but they have decided that technology rather than the human contact of doing justice between

people will be now done between a machine and using surrogates who review the documents or the potential evidence and bring forward a charge.

(54:32). According to Petitioners' witness, the City sought and has now found ways "to sneak around the basis of the law." (54:50). The City's Ordinance constitutes an improper attempt to evade the obligations of law and the evolved rights of the people to fair treatment under the law.

e. The City Failed to Present Any Admissible Evidence

The only purported evidence of the alleged infraction is a videotape purportedly showing Ms. Nicasio's car going through a red turn arrow without stopping. Remarkably, the City does not even include that tape in the record of this case on appeal. Ms. Nicasio objected to the tape when it was shown at the hearing, because the tape itself could not be deciphered by the Hearing Officer. At the hearing, the Police Officer "narrated" the video, giving a narrative description of what she claimed the tape showed. Petitioner Nicasio's objection was that "when a picture is used in evidence, the picture needs to speak for itself; it's improper for a witness to interpret what the evidence shows." The Hearing Officer responded that "it's what she sees in the picture. . . .What she saw, or she thinks she saw." And the Assistant City Attorney contended that "She needs to testify as to where the vehicle was, what color the light was, which lane, which direction" The City's attorney stated, "I can't see that she's driving north, can you?" Petitioners' counsel's response was that he couldn't see any of that on the tape, and "what we have is clearly hearsay evidence," to which the Assistant City Attorney replied, "That's right, which is allowed." The Hearing Officer stated "Your objection is noted." (1:55 pm; also, 2:48 pm).

Only under the "relaxed" set of rules for this administrative hearing could a tape recording that the Hearing Officer could not understand or interpret without a running narrative by a Police Officer who was not present when the pictures were taken be presented over a hearsay objection. Since the unauthenticated pictures are the only demonstration that there was

any infraction, and a substantial property interest is involved, the legal residuum rule is applicable. *Young v. Board of Pharmacy*, 81 N.M. 5; 462 P.2d 139 (1969). Under that rule there must be some admissible evidence to support the claim, even in an administrative proceeding.

The City's reliance on a nuisance theory described above provides yet another substantial basis for objection that the City has failed to provide evidence in support of its claim against the Petitioners. It is apparent that the City made no effort whatsoever, and presented absolutely no evidence, to prove that Ms. Nicasio or her car were any sort of "nuisance," or that the alleged violation of a red stop light or turn arrow resulted in any harm at all. In *Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board.*, 101 N.M. 291, 295; 681 P.2d 717, 721 (1984), the Board was required to show not only that the alleged violation would "tend" to cause harm, but that actual harm would result from the granting of the requested variance.

Here the required minimal proof should be that the vehicle or Ms. Nicasio were public nuisances, and that they and their conduct or misconduct had some detrimental effect on the community. There was not even any testimony or evidence of a tendency of Ms. Nicasio's Hyundai to cause any harm, to say nothing of any actual evidence that harm (or a "nuisance") was the result of anything done by Petitioner or her vehicle. Considering that the City purports to have the ability to seize the vehicle even though there is no evidence that the vehicle is either a nuisance or could produce any harm as a result of the alleged violation, the City's actions are without basis or legal or evidentiary support, and are thus both unsupported by evidence and arbitrary and in violation of the Petitioner's rights.

f. Conclusion

In Petitioners' closing argument, Petitioners' counsel argued that:

we don't have any testimony about anything the registered owner of this vehicle did that says that there's any culpability, you have to have some conduct, and you

just can't put it on a car. So when we have a car that's the perpetrator, you're saying the car did something, that's just wrong and I think your decision should accordingly be that that car, that very nice 2005 maroon Hyundai, is not a nuisance.

(CD-2, 8:35).

The Hearing Officer overruled the Petitioners' hearsay and authentication objections and arguments and entered the tape into evidence. (CD-2, 9:02). Then, without acknowledging the "nuisance abatement" issues, the Hearing Officer found that the vehicle entered the intersection without making a lawful stop and that its registered owner was required to pay the \$100.00 fine. (CD-2, 9:00). According to the Hearing Officer, "the State statute is very, very clear on what you have to do" to appeal. (CD-2, 10:20). Because the City's Ordinance does not include any provision for appeal, Petitioners filed this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule 75, N.M. R. Civ. Proc.

4. Relief Requested

Under the facts, circumstances and law in this case, the Court is respectfully requested to:

- a.) Declare the acts and omissions of Respondent described herein, and particularly the application and enforcement of the purported nuisance abatement STOP Ordinance to be illegal, unconstitutional, and in violation of the law;
- b.) Enjoin the City's use of the nuisance abatement ordinance for enforcement of traffic laws and require adherence to principles and rules contained in the Federal and State Constitution, State traffic laws, and City traffic ordinances;
- c.) Pay to Petitioners any damages proximately resulting from Respondents' unlawful conduct and violations of legal or constitutional rights, together with costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
- d.) Award such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul Livingston
Attorney for Petitioners
P.O. Box 250
Placitas, NM 87043
(505) 771-4000
(505) 771-2333 (fax)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served the foregoing Statement of Review Issues to the City's Legal Department and the City's Boards and Commissions Office, on or before September 13, 2006.

Paul Livingston